NYC HEALTH CARE COALITION (NYCHCC) LEADERSHIP COUNCIL MEETING

NYC DOHMH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE BUREAU OF HEALTHCARE SYSTEM READINESS

Wednesday, December 13, 2017





WELCOME!



Morning Agenda

8:30 – 9:00 AM	Registration and Networking
9:00 – 9:15 AM	Welcome and National Health Care Coalition Conference Update William Lang, Director, Hospitals and Coalitions, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
9:15 – 9:25 AM	Opening Remarks Celia Quinn, Executive Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
9:25 – 9:40 AM	NYCHCC Charter Workshop Report Out / Next Steps William Lang, Director, Hospitals and Coalitions, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Aaron Belisle, Acting Director, Emergency Planning Unit, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Darrin Pruitt, Deputy Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
9:40 – 10:00 AM	<i>Citywide Surge Exercise - Update</i> Marie Irvine, Emergency Response Coordinator, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
10:00 – 11:00 AM	Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) Department of Homeland Security
11:00 – 11:15 PM	Networking Break
11:15 – 11:45 AM	NYC DOHMH's EmPower Project Tamer Hadi, Director of Strategic Technology, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



Afternoon Agenda

11:45 – 12:15 PM	Clinical - Emerging Diseases, What's on the Radar Mary Foote, Senior Medical Coordinator for Communicable Disease Preparedness, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene			
12:15 – 12:45 PM	Lunch			
12:45 – 1:00 PM	Planning Considerations for Budgetary Period 2 (BP2) Darrin Pruitt, Deputy Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene			
1:00 – 1:45 PM	Brainstorming: BP2 Deliverables for Borough Coalitions			
1:45 – 2:00 PM	Brainstorming: Report Out			
2:00 – 2:30 PM	HVA Updates and Jurisdictional Risk Assessment Shadrzad Kardooni, Preventive Medicine Resident, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Francoise Pickart, Senior Risk Analyst, Agency Preparedness & Response, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene			
2:30 – 2:40 PM	Networking Break			
2:40 – 3:40 PM	Puerto Rico Updates w/ Q&A Nancy Pagan, RPAC, MPA-S, New York Presbyterian – Weill Cornell Emergency Department Timothy Styles, Medical Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene			
3:40 – 3:50 PM	Member Announcements & Invitations to Upcoming Events			
3:50 – 4:00 PM	Concluding Remarks			



OPENING REMARKS

Celia Quinn, Executive Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



NYCHCC CHARTER: UPDATE / NEXT STEPS

William Lang, Director, Hospitals and Coalitions, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Aaron Belisle, Acting Director, Emergency Planning Unit, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Darrin Pruitt, Deputy Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



HEALTHCARE COALITION PREPAREDNESS PLAN

BP1 HPP Requirement

Darrin Pruitt, Deputy Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



HPP requires...

- HCC structure, member guidelines for participation and engagement, policies & procedures, integration within existing state, local, and member-specific incident management, specific roles for members
- Member priorities based on HVA, complement facility planning, strategic & operational objectives
- Information sharing, coordination and resources during emergencies, recovery plan
- Much is contained already in the Charter

□Input

- representation rate of HCC core (acute care, EMS, EM, Public Health)
- % of HCCs completing and approving the plan



We plan to meet the requirements by...

Leveraging information gathered for the Healthcare System Playbook

Leveraging the content of the HCC charter

Developing mechanism (checklist) for proposed activities, methods for reporting progress, processes for accountability and completion

Completing template provided by HPP



We need your involvement specifically...

□Review and approval of the plan before June, 2018

□Annual review and/or after coalition exercises or real events

□Next Steps

- DOHMH drafts plan, provides for your review
- All HCC members get a copy of the plan
- Begin preparing to submit the coalition response plan due at the end of BP2



THANK YOU!



CITYWIDE SURGE EXERCISE -UPDATE

Marie Irvine, Emergency Response Coordinator, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



What is SurgeEx?

□The Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (HHS APSR) designed the exercise to help Health Care Coalitions **identify gaps in surge and response readiness through a low- to no-notice exercise**.

The exercise is a required annual deliverable for all HHS ASPR Hospital Preparedness Program Awardees 2017-2020 – 8 associated ASPR HPP Performance Metrics. Current Budget Period 1 sets a baseline metric

□The exercise was piloted in South Dakota, Texas, Michigan, and Wyoming.





SurgeEx (cont.)

- □The exercise scenario (TBD) is expected to simulated evacuation of at least **20% of the acute care beds in a healthcare coalition**.
 - HHS ASPR and DOHMH consider NYC one single coalition comprised of a number of networks and independent facilities
- □Low- to no-notice functional exercise.
- Designed to be challenging.
- □Intended to improve health care system response readiness.
- □Intended to test the overall health care system response.
- □<u>Work in progress</u>





SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5 SE1 (2020)(2018)(2019)(2021)2022

□ SurgeEx 2018

- Baseline
- Major Gaps
- Focus on Acute Care Sector


□ SurgeEx 2019

- Adding other sectors (Nursing Homes, Primary Care...)
- Address Gaps Specifically
- Added SurgeEx deliverables to support development





SurgeEx Elements



	Element	Participants	Time/Date	Outcome
1	Functional Exercise (FE)	 55 hospitals (sending and receiving) 7 Networks City/State Agencies 	 First Two Weeks of <u>April 2018</u> 150 min. (2.5 h) At facilities/network locations 	 Sending, receiving and bed matching data (quantitative)
2	Facilitated Discussion + Hotwash	 55 hospitals (incl. independents) 7 Networks City/State Agencies 	 May 8^{th,} 2018 180-min. (1.5h) + 30-minute Hotwash At combined EPS/LCM 	 Identify gaps/issues in surge capacity (qualitative)





Proposed Exercise Objectives

Functional Exercise (FE) Objectives: (April 2018)

□By the end of the exercise, participating evacuating hospitals will have assessed their ability to **identify patients for rapid discharge** within 60 minutes of exercise notification.

- □By the end of the exercise, participating networks and facilities will have assessed their ability **to conduct bed-matching of evacuating patients** within 90 and 180 minutes of STARTEX.
- □By the end of the exercise, participating evacuating hospitals will have assessed their ability to **identify transportation assets** within 90 and 180 minutes of STARTEX.

Facilitated Discussion Objective(s): (May 8th, 2018)

□By the end of the exercise, the NYC HCC, including city agencies, partner organizations and participating networks and facilities will have discussed strengths and weaknesses in NYC's healthcare system's ability to surge 20%+ in response to an incident requiring mass-evacuation of acute care facilities, incl. capabilities such as **rapid discharge, bed matching, transportation assets and coordination/communications**.




SurgeEx Deliverables

- 1. Identify Trusted Agent (controller) (Network + Facility)
- 2. Quantitative Data (FE)
 - Collected through SitStat at 90 + 180 minutes
- 3. Quantitative Data
 - Collected through SitStat at 90 + 180 minutes (FE)
 - Collected at Facilitated Discussion (May 8th)
 - Collected through "Key Strenghts and Weaknesses" template, to be provided by DOHMH





SurgeEx FE C/E Staffing



All Networks + Facilities are required to provide one (1) trusted agent who will function as a controller on the day of the functional exercise (FE)



Network-Level:

- 1 Trusted Agent
- 1 Evaluator
- Players

Facility-Level:

- 1 Trusted Agent
- 1 Evaluator*
- Players

*evacuating facilities, receiving TBD





Scenario 2018: Coastal Storm



Hurricane William



THANK YOU!

Marie Irvine

mirvine1@health.nyc.gov

o: 347-296-2646

c: 646-799-4741



REGIONAL RESILIENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (RRAP)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY



NETWORKING BREAK



NYC DOHMH'S EMPOWER PROJECT

Tamer Hadi, Director of Strategic Technology, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene







Using Medicare Data to Communicate with Electricity-Dependent Durable Medical Equipment Users and Dialysis Patients in NYC

Tamer Hadi

Director of Strategic Technology

Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response **NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene**





What is the emPOWER Initiative?

□ Partnership between CMS and ASPR

- Medicare billing data to provide public health jurisdictions better understanding of their at-risk populations who rely on electricity-dependent medical devices and dialysis
- Data contains information on:
 - Durable Medical Equipment (ventilator, O₂ concentrator, cardiac devices, wheel chair, etc.)
 - Dialysis Patients
 - Home Health Services

<u>2 DATA SETS</u><u>De-Identified Data Set</u><u>Identified Data Set</u>Emergency PlanningEmergency ResponseDe-Identified DatabaseOutreach Dataset



Publicly available vs Emergency Planning De-Identified data sets

Publicly available: total electricity-dependent
Found on ASPR's website

□Available to local health and partners for emergency planning: aggregate data by medical equipment type


- Shared with local health for approved data uses
- Updated 1-2 times per year



Publicly Available Data Set

Emergency Planning De-Identified Database

https://empowermap.hhs.gov/



NYC Health

Purpose: enhance situational awareness of and support emergency planning for at-risk individuals that rely on select durable medical equipment (DME)



Data Source:

- Medicare Fee For Service (FFS) Part A and B beneficiary administrative claims data (~32M 65+, blind, ESRD (dialysis), dual-eligible, disabled-can include adults and children)
- □Medicare Advantage claims data (~17M 65+, blind , ESRD (dialysis), dualeligible, disabled-can include adults and children)
- Data does **NOT** include individuals that are only enrolled in a State Medicaid Program
- Medicare DME are subject to insurance claim reimbursement caps (e.g. rental caps) that differ by type and therefore may have a different "look-back" periods (e.g. ventilators are 13 months and oxygen concentrators are 36 months)

□Information provided in Menu and Data Overview tabs of the workbook



Approved Data Uses:

The de-identified dataset is approved for use by the state/territory and local health department, either directly or in collaboration with their ESF-8, 6,14 or other partners as appropriate, for public health emergency response, preparedness/mitigation, recovery and resilience activities. All other potential uses of this data require prior approval from ASPR and CMS.



Privacy Protections:

As Medicare beneficiary privacy protection is our priority, all personal identifiable information has been removed from this dataset and numerous de-identified methods have been applied to significantly minimize, if not completely mitigate, any potential for deduction of small cells or re-identification risk. For example, any cell size found between the range of 1 and 10 is masked and shown as 11.



Using the De-Identified Data Set for Planning

□New ASPR requirement for Healthcare Coalitions to:

- "obtain de-identified data from emPOWER map every six months to identify populations with unique health care needs"
- coordinate with ESF-8 for medical planning and transportation of these populations

DOHMH, FDNY EMS, and NYCEM are working together to plan how to use the emPOWER data during an evacuation



De-Identified / Aggregate Data *Medicare Beneficiaries & Electricity-Dependence*

Unite	d States			New York State		
Geographical Area:		U.S.	U.S. Geographical Area:		New York	
Beneficiaries:		52,338,023	Beneficiaries:		3,096,141	
Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries:		2,469,694	Electricity-De	Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries:		
		NY	С			
Bronx		Manha		Queens		
Geographical Area:	Bronx	Geographical Area:	New York	Geographical Area:	Queens	
Beneficiaries:	175,260	Beneficiaries:	239,418	Beneficiaries:	298,798	
Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries: 3,526		Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries:	5,141	Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries:	6,097	
Brooklyn		klyn	Stat	ten Island		
	Geographical Area:	Kings	Geographical Area:	Richmond		
	Beneficiaries:	315,085	Beneficiaries:	75,697		
Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries:		ies: 7,556	Electricity-Dependent	Beneficiaries:		
	L	Total NVC Madiaara	Demoficienico 4			

Total NYC Medicare Beneficiaries = 1.2 M

Total Electricity-Dependent Beneficiaries = 24,032





Types of Durable Medical Equipment (DME) NYC Breakdown

# In-Facility ESRD Dialysis	# O2 Services [Tanks]	# Home Health	
- Diarysis -	▼	-	
10,008	7,512	22,425	

# Cardiac Devices	# Ventilators	# BiPAPs	# O2 Concentrators	# Enteral Feeding
-	-	•	·	
1,454	1,922	781	13,259	2,313

# IV Infusion Pumps	# Suction Pumps	# At-Home ESRD Dialysis	# Motorized Wheelchairs or Scooters	# Electric Beds
*	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	*	¥	*
1,880	1,551	1,364	2,014	8,020





Identified Outreach Data How is DOHMH Going to Use the Data?

- 1) Request Individualized Data from ASPR
 - o Name, DOB, Address, Devices Used
- 2) Add NYC Hurricane Evacuation Zones
 - Determine which zones we want to message
- 3) Reverse Phone Look-Up (Vendor)
 - Obtain landlines and cell phones (***cost involved***)
- 4) Provide Ventilator Patient Data to FDNY EMS
- 5) Disseminate voice and text messages using DOHMH
 - **Emergency Notification System**
 - o 72-96 hours out
 - o 24-48 hours out
 - Within 24 hours after storm passes



What Are We Going to Say? Short, Effective Messages

□ 72-96 hours out – Preparedness Focus

- Make arrangements now to relocate, prepare go-bag, batteries/backups, get dialysis treatment
- Refer to website with detailed preparedness tips

24-48 hours out – Evacuation/Sheltering Focus

- Advise on mandatory evacuation, relocate now or call 311 for assistance, items to bring, 311 for nearest evac center
- Refer to website with detailed preparedness tips

□ After storm passes – Safety Check

- o Call 311 for evacuation assistance
- o Call 911 for life-threatening emergencies







FDNY EMS is going to message and offer evacuation assistance to all <u>Ventilator patients</u> in potentially affected coastal storm zones





Challenges

□ *Turnaround time for requesting data / phone number lookup*

- Data Security
- □ How to use for no-notice events

Next Steps

Data Drill to test entire process

Larger exercise w/ FDNY EMS drilling vent patient evacuations

National Work Group – ASPR advised that a work group will be formed for jurisdictions to share best practices.



Questions & Discussion

Tamer Hadi

thadi@health.nyc.gov

🕒 @tamer_hadi

in http://www.linkedin.com/in/tamerhadi



CLINICAL - EMERGING DISEASES, WHAT'S ON THE RADAR

Mary Foote, Senior Medical Coordinator for Communicable Disease Preparedness, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene





42


What's on our radar?

2017 Review: Ebola

Democratic Republic of the Congo (May—July)

- May 11, 2017, DRC reported a cluster of suspected EVD cases in remote Likati zone -
- Within days, international teams had arrived to support response and testing
- Mobile lab established for diagnoses
- Cases = 8 likely, 5 confirmed

Deaths = 4



43

The map shows the country of Democratic Republic of Congo, located in Central Africa, and indicates outbreaks of Ebola that have happened there.

Source: WHO

2017 Review: Pneumonic Plague

Madagascar (August-November)

- Spread by exposure to infected rats/fleas (bubonic) <u>or</u> through respiratory droplets (pneumonic)
- Outbreak unusual due to scale, urban spread, predominance pneumonic form
- >700 contacts identified and prophylaxed



Plague


Plague is an infectious disease that can become severe if left untreated. If diagnosed early, plague can be cured with antibiotics and supportive care.







Early **diagnosis and treatment** are essential - the fatality rate is 30-100% if left untreated



The most common type of plague affects the lymph nodes. It can be severe, but there is no human to human transmission. The deadliest and most rapid form of plague occurs when it reaches the lungs. It can be transmitted person to person via droplets in the air.

Middle ages
Head ages




2017 Review: Marburg



Uganda and Kenya (October—December)

- October 17^{th,} 2017 Ugandan notified WHO of an outbreak of Marburg Virus Disease in remote mountainous area
 - Marburg is a close cousin to Ebola
- 1st case was hunter with likely exposure to bat caves
 - > 2 additional cases in same family, one traveled to Kenya when ill
- Rapid national and international response
 - Intense contact tracing
 - Mobile lab services (CDC/EU)
 - Healthcare worker safety support through IC messaging and PPE kit distribution
 - coordination between Uganda and Kenya to improve surveillance



45


Map showing areas of the relative probability of the presence of filovirus (Ebola and Marburg virus) outbreak in Uganda. (Nyakarahuka, PLOS Currents Outbreaks, 2017)

Updates: MERS-CoV


As of May 2017

Ę

- 1980 laboratory-confirmed cases
- > 720 deaths (case–fatality rate: 36.4%) were reported globally
- ► April—May→ KSA had 3 hospital outbreaks in/around Riyadh
 - 13 cases, 3 deaths
- Improved infection control practices have greatly reduced healthcare associated cases



What's on Our Radar for 2018 and beyond?



Avian Influenza Viruses ("Bird-flus")

- Four types of influenza viruses identified to date (A, B, C, D)
 - A and B types cause "seasonal influenza", only type A causes pandemics
- Most 'flu As' are from birds (waterfowl) but can also infect pigs
- > Avian influenza A viruses are classified based on molecular and pathogenicity criteria
 - Low pathogenic avian influenza A viruses (LPAI)
 - Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
- Either type can cause severe disease in humans
- Novel influenza A virus infection



Source: Dr. Timothy Uyeki

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus

- First human infections identified in 1997
 - 18 human cases, 6 deaths
- Re-emergence in 2003
 - Family cluster visited southern China (2 deaths)
- Wide-spread poultry outbreaks and wild bird die-offs in >60 countries 2005-2006
- 6 countries considered endemic by FAO 2011
 - Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Vietnam
 - Other countries with poultry outbreaks (Cambodia)

- Sporadic human infections continue to occur
 - 2017: Human cases reported in Egypt
 - 859 sporadic cases reported since 2003 from 16 countries

- Cumulative case fatality proportion = 53%
- Admission findings:
 - High fever, cough, dyspnea, shortness of breath, leukopenia, lymphopenia, thrombocytopenia, bilateral pneumonia, hypoxia

50

Low-Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus

March 31, 2013: China reported 3 human cases to WHO

- All 3 adults in eastern China died
- 2 of 3 had poultry exposure
- Novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus identified
 - Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A virus
 - Causes no disease in infected poultry

Risk factors:

- Recent poultry exposure
- Visiting a live poultry market
- Raising backyard poultry
- Older age, chronic co-morbidities

Clinical characteristics

- Most patients admitted 5-7 days after onset
- Most had viral pneumonia
- Multi-organ failure (respiratory, renal)
- Resistance to neuraminidase inhibitor antivirals
 - Emergence reported during treatment with oseltamivir
- Some mild cases identified

51

Novel Influenza Type A: Infection Control

Standard Precautions

- Hand hygiene
- Contact Precautions
 - Gloves and gown
 - Eye protection
 - Dedicated equipment
 - Disinfect surfaces frequently
- Airborne Precautions
 - Single airborne infection isolation room (AIIR)
 - Fit tested respirator

Antimicrobial Resistance

The slow moving tsunami

- Bacteria
 - Gram negatives
 - Gram positives

Yeast

- Candida auris
- Drug resistant gonorrhea

ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THE GLOBAL THREAT

Antibiotic resistance – when bacteria change and cause antibiotics to fail – is happening **RIGHT NOW**, across the world

The full impact is unknown. There is no system in place to track antibiotic resistance globally





Without urgent action, many modern medicines could become obsolete, turning even common infections into deadly threats.

A GROWING CRISIS WORLDWIDE

Cholera

l,≡

- Acute gastrointestinal infection caused by ingestion of food or water containing the Vibrio cholerae (serogroup O1 or O139)
- - E.g. Yemen and Somalia
- Establishment in the Americas
 - Starting in Haiti, 2010
- Vaccines now commercially available



Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

Global health community closely monitoring for potential outbreaks

- Ebola Virus Disease
- Marburg
- Lassa Fever

Vector-Borne Diseases (Mosquitos)

Yellow Fever (*Flavivirus*) → acute viral hemorrhagic disease, fatal in 20% to 50% of severe cases

- Angola/DRC 2015—2016
- Brazil 2017
- Zika Virus
- Dengue

Ę

- Chikungunya
- Other (India)





S ARE SMALL

Synthetic Biology

"A future...bioterrorism attack with a highly lethal agent, such as drug-resistant *Bacillus anthracis*, variola virus, or some other genetically altered pathogen, is not only possible but also highly likely." – Michael Osterholm



- Rapidly advancing technologies
 - CRISPR gene editing
 - "Gain of function" research
- "Dual Use" dilemma
 - Same technologies can be used for *good* or *evil*
 - Creates threat of new "designer' pathogens
 - Intentional or unintentional release
- Many potential sources of risk

Synthetic Biology Means ?

 It is an emerging field of biology that aims at designing and building novel biological systems.

The final goal is to be able to design biological systems in the same way engineers design electronic or mechanical systems.

Dr.T.V.Rao MD

The "Unknown Unknowns"

"NO PANDEMIC HAS EVER BEEN PREDICTED BEFORE IT INFECTED HUMANS"

- Patterns have appeared that bring into clearer focus the types of pathogens and environments where new diseases are most likely to emerge, as well as the roles that humans and animals play.
- Lessons learned from recent outbreaks are strengthening global health capacity to "prevent, detect and respond."

Action Roadmap

Focus on infection control and surveillance

Maintain frontline staff capabilities to "identify, isolate and inform"

- Screening all patients presenting with acute illness for infectious diseases of public health concern
- "All infectious hazards" planning
- Multidisciplinary approach

Thank You

Mary Foote, MD, MPH

mfootemd@health.nyc.gov

347.396.2686



LUNCH



PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR BUDGETARY PERIOD 2 (BP2)

Darrin Pruitt, Deputy Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



HPP Requirements, BP2 and over 5 years

□Coalition Response Plan – informed by member EOPs; must show operations that support strategic planning, information sharing, and resource management

□Coalition HVA – annual review

□Surge Exercise – HPP requirements + broaden to prepare for evac/surge across all sectors

□Supply Chain Integrity – build on what we learn in BP1 about acute care sector.

□2 communications drills

□Crisis Standards of Care - By June 2022, must document processes to oversee jurisdictional crisis standards of care (CSC) planning and to coordinate all local or regional planning efforts.



BRAINSTORMING: BP2 DELIVERABLES FOR BOROUGH COALITIONS



LOOKING AHEAD TO BP2, THE ROLE OF BOROUGH COALITIONS

Darrin Pruitt, Deputy Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



Review of your strategic plans

Assess (20) – feasibility of alternate care sites, assessment of regional resources, cataloging facility types

Plan (94) – resource management, surge response, coordination

Train (11) – resource requests; local, state, federal systems and assets; EM basics to all staff □Exercise (18) – coalition level exercises (Surge Ex 2.0)

Communications/Situational Awareness (49) – mass notification systems, situational awareness tools/applications



Think about...

- borough coalitions in preparedness, response and recovery
- capabilities to be developed to help Borough Coalitions build resilience at the community level
- catastrophic scenarios (e.g., nuclear detonation, severe pandemic, aerosolized anthrax release) to plan activities to encourage building resilience at the community level



Healthcare System Playbook, Healthcare System Objectives

- Coordinate Healthcare System Response
- Establish Alternate Care Sites
- Evacuate Healthcare Facilities
- Leverage Citywide Infrastructure
- Provide Adequate Staffing
- Provide Clear, Timely Communications
- Provide Mental Health Response
- Provide Mutual Aid
- Provide Patient Care
- Respond to Medical Surge
- Support Family Reunification



Alignment of strategic plan objectives with Healthcare System Playbook

Assess – feasibility of alternate care sites

Exercise – evacuation of healthcare facilities

□Plan surge response

□Train – cited in support of almost all resource elements

Communications/Situational Awareness – single situational awareness tool



Your input

- Break into 3 groups, 2 facilitators each
- Complete worksheets, conferring with colleagues
- Ask for help from facilitators
- Report out



BRAINSTORMING: REPORT OUT



HVA UPDATES & JURISDICTIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT



HVA UPDATES

Shadrzad Kardooni, Preventive Medicine Resident, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



JURISDICTIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

Francoise Pickart, Senior Risk Analyst, Agency Preparedness & Response, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



The Jurisdictional Risk Assessment

How do you allocate preparedness and mitigation resources where they are most needed?

In January 2018, DOHMH will begin work on a Public Health Risk Assessment to answer:

- How do we define the risk of public health hazards to NYC?
- What are the highest priority public health hazards for NYC?

This will be an inclusive process and your participation will be requested.

Final results will be published and included in NYC Emergency Management's Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP).

New York City Public Health Jurisdictional Risk Assessment



Previous Work

2013

- DOHMH Public Health Hazard Risk Assessment
- DOHMH Metropolitan Statistical Area-wide Public Health Risk Assessment Report.

Top Hazards Region Wide

- 1. Storm/Weather
- 2. Pandemic
- 3. Flooding
- 4. Terrorism
- 5. Nuclear Facility Offsite Release
- 6. Power Outages
- 7. Hazardous Materials
- 8. Utility Disruption
- 9. Transportation Accidents
- 10. Explosions

DISASTER SCENARIO NYC HMP Section	SEVERITY	PROBABILITY	IMPACT OF PLANNING	PRIORITY RANK
Coastal Storm* Coastal Storms	2	6	2	1
Pandemic Influenza* Disease Outbrea <i>k</i> s	5	9	1	2
Extreme Heat* Extreme Temperatures	8	1	6	2
Flooding Flooding	6	4	7	4
Aerosolized Anthrax Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuke (CBRN)	4	10	3	5
Radiological Dispersal Device* Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuke (CBRN)	3	11	3	5
Improvised Explosive Device* Not included in HMP†	7	7	5	7
Improved Nuclear Device Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuke (CBRN)	1	12	8	8
Winter Weather Winter Storms	9	3	10	9
Chlorine Release Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuke (CBRN)	10	5	9	10
Food Contamination Disease Outbreaks	12	2	11	11
Tornado Seyere Weather	11	8	12	12



New York City Public Health Jurisdictional Risk Assessment

Different Stakeholder Groups

DOHMH will be creating 4 citywide workgroups:

- The Severity workgroup: Identify and rank the top contributors to assessing the potential harm to the public's health.
- Probability workgroup: Identify and rank the top contributors to estimating the likelihood that an event will occur.
- The Coping Capacity workgroup: Identify and rank the top contributors to assessing the City's ability to cope with the event (includes preparedness and mitigation efforts).
- The Hazard Ranking workgroup: Identify and rank the top public health hazards to the city based on the work of the other workgroups.

More details will be available in January, we aim to complete the assessment by August 2018 and publish results online by November.

New York City Public Health Jurisdictional Risk Assessment



NETWORKING BREAK



PUERTO RICO UPDATES WITH Q & A



POST HURRICANE MARIA RESPONSE EXPERIENCE

Nancy Pagan, RPAC, MPA-S New York Presbyterian - Weill Cornell Emergency Department




Hurricane Maria

Devastated Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017

□Category 5 Hurricane

□Over 1000 deaths thus far (12/09/17 NY Times)



Pre-Deployment to Puerto Rico

Image: Medical clearance by Employee Health

- Updated vaccinations
- Mental Health clearance

□Picked up supplies and equipment

• Included food, clothes, bags, flashlight and other necessities

□Clear work schedule

Colleagues very supportive

□Awaited the call for departure details

Deployment to Puerto Rico

Departure October 24, 2017

 Second response team sent by NYP met at the hospital and transported by bus to JFK


Commercial flight to San Juan, Puerto Rico

- Team of 14, only three familiar to me
- Flight consisted of response personnel and everyday travelers

Arrival at San Juan, Puerto Rico

□After arrival, traveled by bus to San Juan Convention Center

□Awaited details of our assignment





First Assignment

□Manati, Puerto Rico

□Coliseum Bencito

- Met with the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) to discuss the operation in place
- NYP Team One passed pertinent information to Team Two who then departed back to JFK

□Chain of Command

- Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)

oTeam Commander

oChief Medical Officer (CMO) and Chief Nursing Officer (CNO)

- Non Governmental Organization (NGO)
 NYP, Stony Brook, JMAC, and FHMC
 - oEach has its own team leader and charge nurse
- Emergency Medical Assistance Compact (EMAC) • Veterans Association (VA)





- □Patient care flow
 - Sign in
 - Triage
 - Assign to respective tent oGreen, Yellow, Red
 - Treat
 - Discharge or transport to hospital by military escort





- □Chronic medical needs
 - Ventilated patients
 - Continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP)

NewYork-Presbyte

rian


□Acute care cases

- Chest pain
- Asthma
- Abdominal pain
- Dehydration
- Leptospirosis

- □Urgent care cases
 - Conjunctivitis
 - Wound care
 - Abscesses
 - Dog bites
 - Burns
 - Machete injuries
 - Viral Illnesses

□Telemedicine

- Provides long distance medical care between patient and clinician via electronic and telecommunication technology
- Utilized for three cases which required a pediatric and adult endocrinologists & an ear, nose and throat specialist (ENT)



□Opened October 4, 2017

- 150 bed Federal Medical Station (FMS)
- Open 24 hours/7 days a week
- 210-220 patients a day

□Currently closed

- Unable to sustain power
- Patients transferred to the Continental United States

Second Assignment

Meeting to split the team

• Help was needed elsewhere due to the volume of patients

Five members volunteered to goOld San Juan, Puerto Rico



Old San Juan Dock

□Chain of Command


- Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)

o Team Commander

- oChief Medical Officer (CMO) and Chief Nursing Officer (CNO)
- Non Governmental Organization (NGO)

 NYP, Stony Brook, JMAC, and FHMC
 Each has its own team leader and charge nurse
- Emergency Medical Assistance Compact (EMAC)
 Veterans Association (VA)

□USNS COMFORT (T-AH-20)



Old San Juan Dock

□Met with DMAT Team Leader and CMO to discuss patient flow

High volume of patients at this location
 0300-320 patients per day

 Implemented a new triage system and opened up a new tent specifically for fast track/urgent care

•New flow tested for 10 hours and permanently implemented

Old San Juan Docks

□Patient care flow

- Sign in
- Triage
- Assign to respective tent oGreen, Yellow, Red
- Treat
- Discharge or transport to USNS Comfort









Old San Juan Docks

□Large percentage of patients needed basic medical care

- Medication refills
- Dental care
- Ophthalmology care
- Gynecological care

□USNS Comfort staff provided dental and ophthalmologic care inside the DMAT tent

USNS Comfort

□Approximately 1000 in patient beds including casualty reception (ER), ICU, Med Surg, Radiology (X-Ray/CT capabilities), OR, Dental, Ophthalmology and Gynecology □NYP members worked in CasRec: Casualty Receiving - is equivalent to the ER with trauma capabilities □Worked with Naval staff

Lived on the USNS Comfort







Sleeping quarters USNS Comfort

Old San Juan Docks

□USNS Comfort arrived in Old San Juan on October 3, 2017

- Treated 1899 patients and completed 191 surgeries (11/21/17, America's Navy)
- Two births on the ship

□Ship departed on November 21, 2017 for the Continental United States



Return to New York City

Departed San Juan, Puerto Rico via charter flight on November 8, 2017

□After two weeks, strangers became friends

□Arrived home to a welcoming committee from NYP

Thank you luncheon from NYP for the two disaster response teams





nypholefalteome home Team 2! Thank you for your <u>#amazing</u> work & commitment to patient care!





#NYPResponds

Send messa	age	
Send messa	age	

Personal Thoughts


- □Reasons for volunteering
- □Impact
- □Return to Puerto Rico
- □Care and gratitude







GRACIAS!



PUERTO RICO RESPONSE EXPERIENCE

Timothy Styles, Medical Director, Bureau of Healthcare System Readiness, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene



MEMBER ANNOUNCEMENTS & INVITATIONS TO UPCOMING EVENTS



CONCLUDING REMARKS

"This [publication, journal article, etc.] was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number TP921922, funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Department of Health and Human Services."

